SOBER-128 is a stream cipher designed by Rose and Hawkes in 2003. It can be also used for generating Message Authentication Codes (MACs) and an authenticated encryption. The developers claimed that it is difficult to forge MACs generated by both functions of SOBER-128, though, the security assumption in the proposal paper is not realistic in some instances. In this paper, we examine the security of these message authentication mechanisms of SOBER-128 under security channel model. As a result, we show that both a MAC generation and an authenticated encryption are vulnerable against differential cryptanalysis. The success probabilities of the MAC forgery attack are estimated at 2 −6 and 2 −27 respectively. In addition, we show that some secret bits are revealed if a key is used many times.
Introduction
The desire to use a known cryptographic module for various applications exists from long ago. The first trial is realized as modes of operation of a block cipher. The OFB mode and the Counter mode are the usages of a block cipher for a random number generation and CBC-MAC provides a message authentication mechanism. On the other hand, Anderson and Biham presented the construction of a block cipher from a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) and a hash function [1] . The security of these modes of operation are provable under the assumption that the underlying primitives are ideal cryptographic functions.
Daemen considered the construction of elemental cryptographic functions, a block cipher, a PRNG, and a hash function, from unreliably weak functions, e.g., a round function of a block cipher [6] . The security of these constructions are not certain, but their processing speeds are often significantly faster than that of modes of operation of a block cipher. Then Daemen and Clapp proposed a cryptographic module P in 1998 [7] . P can be used as a PRNG and as a hash function. Ferguson et al. proposed an authenticated encryption algorithm Helix in 2003 [11] . Helix can be also used as a PRNG and for a MAC generation.
SOBER [18] is a stream cipher developed by Rose in † † The author is with Science University of Tokyo, Noda-shi, 278-8510 Japan.
* Earlier version of this paper was published in FSE 2004 [20] . a) E-mail: daidai@sdl.hitachi.co.jp DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e88-a. 5.1166 1998. SOBER adopts a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) defined over GF (2 8 ) as the update function of the internal state. This construction enables an efficient software implementation in 8-bit processors so that LFSRs defined over an extension field are employed not only by SOBER, but also by SSC2 [21] , SNOW [8] , [10] , and so on.
Several variants of SOBER have been developed to strengthen its security or to be suitable for 16-bit and 32-bit processors. SOBER-t16 [12] , -t32 [13] , Turing [14] , SOBER-128 [15] are published algorithms. SOBER-t16 and -t32 were submitted to NESSIE project, but were rejected because some security flaws are reported [4] , [5] , [9] . A weakness of the initialization of Turing has been also reported [16] .
SOBER-128 is the latest algorithm in SOBER family, and is the modified version of SOBER-t32. In addition, SOBER-128 can be used not only as a stream cipher, but also as a MAC generation function and as an authenticated encryption function.
In this paper, we examine the security of these message authentication mechanisms of SOBER-128. We show that both a MAC generation and an authenticated encryption are vulnerable against differential cryptanalysis. I.e., any message pair with a certain differential generates a same MAC with high probability. The success probabilities of the MAC forgery attack are 2 −6 and 2 −27 , respectively. Furthermore, we show that some secret bits can be recovered if a key is used many times to generate MACs. This situation often happens in current packet based data transmission. But this weakness does not intend to the total break of SOBER-128.
The attack that we present in this paper is out of the expectation of the designers. Our attack follows the security notion defined by Bellare and Namprempre [2] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Firstly we define the supposed attacker in this paper in Sect. 2. Secondly we briefly describe the MAC generation algorithm of SOBER-128 in Sect. 3. Then we show the attack on the MAC generation function of SOBER-128 in Sect. 4 and the authenticated encryption function in Sect. 5. After that we show how to recover some secret bit of the internal state in Sect. 6. Then, we discuss the weakness of SOBER-128 in Sect. 7. At last we summarize the result in Sect. 8.
The Model of the Attack
The designers of SOBER-128 suggested in their proposal that the recovery of the internal state (or the secret key) is Copyright c 2005 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers necessary in order to forge a MAC generated by SOBER-128 and resolved the difficulty of a MAC forgery into that of the recovery of the internal state. In the attack to recover the internal state, the attacker can generate a MAC for a message with a secret key and an IV only once. Under their security notional description, the attacker can make queries only to a (probabilistic) MAC generation oracle.
In this paper, we consider a MAC forgery without any knowledge about the secret internal state. The attacker we supposed is a malicious person in a public communication channel. In our attack, there are a sender of messages, a receiver, and the attacker. The sender sends pairs of a message and the associated tag (M, MAC(M, K)) to the receiver. The attacker intercepts them, changes only the message, then sends (M , MAC(M, K)) to the receiver. The attack is successful if the receiver does not detect the manipulation of a message.
The security notion of this attack was given by Bellare and Namprempre [2] . Under the notion, the attacker can make queries not only to the MAC generation oracle, but also to the MAC verification oracle. For each query, the MAC verification oracle returns 1 if the attached tag is correct, and return 0 otherwise. In real communication, the MAC verification oracle is the receiver and he outputs a requirement of retransmission to the sender if he detects the manipulation.
There is no difference between these two attacks if the oracles are deterministic as a MAC verification oracle can be constructed from a MAC generation oracle. However, they are essentially different if the oracle is probabilistic, i.e., the oracle has a nonce as an input. In our model, the attacker can make a query for each oracle. On the other hand, the attacker whom the designers supposed can make only a query to a MAC generation oracle. The difference is critical to apply differential attack, which is given in Sect. 4.
The Algorithm of SOBER-128
SOBER-128 is a filtering generator which takes a secret key and an initial vector (IV) as inputs. The lengths of inputs are not more than 128 bits. The update function of the internal state is an LFSR whose feedback polynomial is defined over GF (2 32 ). The non-linear filtering function consists of additions modulo 2 32 , XORings, a circular shift, and 8 × 32-bit substitution boxes (S-boxes) S (See Fig. 1 for detail) .
The Linear Feedback Shift Register
Before giving the definition of the LFSR, we firstly define the bit representation of elements of a finite field GF(2 w ). The extension field over GF (2) is defined by the residue field GF (2) [z]/(ϕ(z)), where ϕ(z) is the irreducible polynomial. An element of GF(2 w ) is a polynomial whose degree is less than w. The bit representation of a polynomial a w−1 z w−1 + a w−2 z w−2 + · · · + a 0 is given by a w−1 z w−1 ||a w−2 z w−2 || · · · ||a 0 , where the notation || means a bit-concatenation.
In the proposal of SOBER-128, the finite field GF(2 32 ) is defined by an extension field of a subfield GF (2 8 ). Firstly the subfield GF( 2 8 ) is given by the residue field
The coefficients in the irreducible polynomial g are the hexadecimal expressions of the elements of GF (2 8 ). Now we can define the feedback polynomial p(x) of the LFSR of SOBER-128:
where α = 0x00000100 (hexadecimal expression) = y. The registers of SOBER-128 is denoted by R = (R[0], R [1] , . . . , R [16] ), where each R[i] is a register of 32-bit length. We use subscript, like R t , if the time t should be clarified. The update function defined by above feedback polynomial is calculated as follows:
Furthermore, we can reduce the calculation of the multiplication with a constant in GF(2 32 ) on 32-bit processor. The multiplication consists of only two operations, referring a pre-computed table Multab indexed by the most significant byte and a shift operation:
whereˆis the XORing operation and <<, >> are the left and right shift operations respectively.
Non-linear Filtering NLF
The non-linear filtering function NLF is defined by the following equation (See Fig. 1 ): where is the addition modulo 2 32 and ≫ is the rotation to right in a 32-bit register. The 8 × 32-bit non-linear substitution f is defined by
where a H and a L are the most significant 8 bits and the least significant 24 bits of the input a respectively (See Fig. 2 ). S 1 and S 2 in Fig. 2 are the substitution boxes that output 8 bits and 24 bits values respectively. Please refer to the proposal document of SOBER-128 [15] for more detail about the substitution table. Konst is dependent only on the a secret key and is independent of an IV. It does not change after the initialization so that we can consider it is a key-dependent constant.
The Message Feedback Function PFF
The message feedback function PFF is used for injecting a message to the LFSR in MAC generation. PFF is given by the following equation:
The value of the register R [4] is replaced by the output of PFF (See Fig. 3 ).
MAC Generation
The MAC generation of SOBER-128 is divided into two phases. The first phase is called MAC accumulation and the second phase is called MAC finalization. Before starting MAC generation, the internal state is initialized with a secret key and an IV.
In the MAC accumulation phase, the message words are injected into the LFSR by using the message feedback function PFF:
In the MAC finalization phase, the internal state is mixed by XORing the constant INIT KONS T to R [15] , applying the non-linear update function Diffuse 18 times. The non-linear function Diffuse is defined as follows:
Step 1. Updating the LFSR.
Step 2. Applying NLF to the register and replacing R [4] with the value R [4] ⊕ ν, where ν is the output of NLF.
After the mixing, SOBER-128 outputs MAC of arbitrary length. The last step is same as the random number generation using NLF.
Authenticated Encryption
The authenticated encryption function of SOBER-128 is just the combination of an encryption (as a stream cipher) and a MAC generation. It works as follows:
Step 2. Applying PFF to a message block P and replacing R [4] with the output of PFF.
Step 3. Applying NLF to the register and XORing P to the output of NLF.
The procedure of the decryption is opposite to that of encryption.
The MAC Forgery
In this section, we show a MAC forgery attack against MAC generation function of SOBER-128. Our attack aims to find a collision of messages with a same secret key and a same IV. For that, we apply differential cryptanalysis developed by Biham and Shamir [3] . Differential cryptanalysis observes the differential propagation of the target encryption function. In differential cryptanalysis, the attacker firstly encrypts amount of plaintext pairs with a fixed differential. and observes the distribution of the differentials of ciphertexts. If the output differentials do not distribute uniformly, the attacker can recover some information of the secret key from the deviation of the distribution.
The basic idea of our attack is finding a pair of message sequence P and P , which yields same internal state value at a certain time T with a secret key and an IV. In a practical sense, the purpose of the attack is finding the differential sequence {∆p t } t with which any message sequence pair P = {p t } t and P = {p t ⊕ ∆p t } t make a collision with high probability.
Our attack is divided into two part. The search for the differential propagation of PFF with high probability and the construction of the differential elimination equation in the LFSR. In the following two subsection, each topic is discussed in detail.
The Differential Propagation in the Message Feedback
Function PFF Firstly, we discuss about the differential propagation in the message feedback function PFF. We denote the differential propagation in the function
The differential characteristic of non-linear permutation f is very large because the transformation is not uniform. Only the most significant byte (MSB) is transformed non-linearly so that any differential ∆ whose most significant byte is zero does not influenced by f , i.e., ∆ f → ∆ holds for ∆ which satisfies above condition with probability 1. Hence, if the byte-wise expression of the differential of the register R [4] is given by (0, δ 1 , δ 2 , 0) and the differential of the message injection p is given by (0, δ 1 , δ 2 , 0), the following differential propagation of PFF holds with high probability:
How to Eliminate Differentials in the LFSR
Next we discuss how to eliminate differentials in the LFSR.
To simplify the discussion, we replace the message feedback function PFF by XORing the message directly to R t [4] . In fact, Equation (5) indicates that any differential of R t [4] can be entirely overwritten by addition to a message block. Hence the discussion with the simplified message injection is useful. To avoid confusion by using the differential ∆p t as the differential of the simplified context, we denote the message block at time t by q t and the differential by ∆q t respectively. The internal state initialized by a secret key K and an initial vector I is denoted by R 0 . We denote by R 0 (K, I) if the initial values should be clarified.
We denote the expression matrix of the LFSR of SOBER-128 defined over GF (2 32 ) by A. In the following discussion, we treat the internal state of the LFSR as a vector space over GF (2 32 ). Equation (5) shows that the injection of the differential to the LFSR is identified by addition of the vector D t given by
The corresponding internal state to message sequence q t ⊕ ∆q t is given by
Equation (6) indicates that the differential vector of the internal state becomes zero at time T iff the following equation is satisfied:
The differential vector D t = t (0, 0, 0, 0, ∆q t , 0, . . . , 0) is divided into the elemental vector e 4 = t (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) and the coefficient ∆q i :
Multiplying a constant is commutative with any matrix, hence we can transform Equation (7) as follows:
A differential sequence which satisfies this equation is given by Cayley-Hamilton relation. The characteristic polynomial of matrix A is given by Equation (1) so that A satisfies the following relation:
where E is the identity matrix of dimension 17. Therefore the following differential sequence ∆q t satisfies Eq. (8):
where a is any element of GF (2 32 ). On the other hand, we examined exhaustive search for byte-wise truncated differential of message sequences {∆q t } t which satisfy Eq. (9) and T ≤ 20 on PC. The experiment concludes that Eq. (10) gives the best differential set, i.e. both the time T and the number of non-zero differentials are smallest. Now we get back to the message injection by PFF. There are two different purpose to inject a message differential ∆p t into the LFSR. One is for injecting a certain differential value into a register, And the other is for eliminating a differential in R t [4] . For each case, ∆p t = ∆q t ≪ 8 and ∆p t = ∆q t yield the same result respectively as in the discussion of the simplified message injection. Table 1 shows the propagation of the differential given in Eq. (10) in the internal state, where b = α · a. Equation (3) implies a significant characteristic of α. If the byte-wise expression of the differential ∆q 0 is given by (0, x, y, z), then α · ∆q 0 = (x, y, z, 0) holds for every x, y, z. For example, the 32-bit differentials corresponding to the truncated differentials a and b in Table 1 are given by 0x00000001 and 0x00000100 respectively.
The Success Probability of the MAC Forgery
In the differential propagation of the message feedback function PFF given by Eq. (5), the differential changes probabilistically only at the addition modulo 2 32 . Lipmaa and Moriai presented the efficient algorithm for calculating the differential probability of an addition modulo 2 n for arbitrary n [17] . For example, if the differential a = 0x00000001 in Eq. (10) is chosen, the differential probabilities of PFF at each time t = 0, 2, 13, and 17 are 2 −2 , 2 −2 , 2 −1 , and 2 −1 respectively. Therefore the success probability of the MAC forgery of SOBER-128 is about 2 −6 . We examined the attack with a sample code provided by the designers. The success probability of the experimental attack is about 2 −4.7 if secret keys and IVs are randomly chosen.
An Extended Attack against the Authenticated Encryption
In this section, we show how to forge the MAC generated by the authenticated encryption function of SOBER-128. The basic idea is to extend the attack against MAC generation function in Sect. 4. In the attack on the authenticated encryption, the attacker gives differentials not to plaintexts, but to ciphertexts. The ciphertext differentials infect the internal state R by PFF, so that infect the output string of the random number generation. In addition, the order of processes in the decryption is decryption then MAC. Hence, the differentials of the internal state affect the differentials of decrypted 
message, so the MAC calculation. To eliminate this undesirable influence of the differentials of the internal state, it is sufficient to give additional differentials to ciphertexts in order to cancel out the differentials of the output of the random number generation. Table 2 shows a ciphertext differential sequence which gives same differential of decrypted message as one given in Table 1 . In Table 2 , ∆c, ∆r, ∆p means differentials of a ciphertext, an output of the random number generation, and a decrypted message, respectively. In the attack on the MAC generation, the attacker can choose a differential whose middle two bytes are active. But in the attack on the authenticated encryption, only a differential whose second byte (from MSB) is active can ignore two f-functions in NLF. Hence a, b, and c in Table 2 are 0x00000100 and 0x00010000, and 0x00000001 respectively, for example.
In the random number generation, NLF takes R[0], R [1] , R [6] , R [13] and R [16] as inputs. Hence the attacker gives additional differentials only if one of these registers has a differential.
In the differential propagation of NLF, the differential changes probabilistically only at the addition modulo 2 32 , too. The success probability of the attack is estimated at 2 −27 . The experiment on a PC confirms that the attack is successful, but the success probability of the attack is about 2 −22 . This difference may be derived from multiple unstudied differential path, but the reason is not clear yet.
Recovery of Konst
In Sect. 4 we estimated the success probability of the MAC forgery attack under the assumption that a secret key and an IV are randomly chosen for each MAC generation. However, a same secret key is often used during a session and only IVs are renewed in a real network communication to decrease the messy key exchange.
Under this condition, the success probability of the MAC forgery attacks is not stable, i.e. it is key-dependent. This phenomena is due to the fact that an addition in PFF is with the key-dependent constant Konst. For example, a differential 0x00000001 does not change with probability 1 if the least significant bit (LSB) of Konst (K 0 ) is zero. On the other hand, the differential changes into 0x00000002 or 0x00000003 if K 0 = 1, so that the discussion in Sect. 4 needs some modifications. As a result of experiments, the success probability of the attack with the differential sequence given in Eq. (1) Let x be the number of the successful attacks in n trials. Then the χ 2 value X of this hypothesis is given by
and χ 2 belongs to χ 2 distribution of a degree of freedom. Let η be a rate of rejection. Then the hypothesis H is rejected if χ 2 > χ 2 (1, η) and we estimate that X belongs to D 2 . Assume that X belongs to D 2 . Then the expected value of x is np 2 , so that Eq. (11) can be transformed as follows:
From the assumption p 2 p 1 1, we finally have the necessary condition for the required number of trials to distinguish two distributions:
With η = 0.05 we have χ 2 (η) = 3.84. Therefore about 62 trials are required to estimate K 0 . However, experimental result shows that about 160 trials required to estimate K 0 .
In the same way we can decide the least 16 bits in turn, but the required numbers of trials for recovery of each bit are different because the differential property of addition depends on their carry bits.
This attack might be applicable to the authenticated encryption algorithm of SOBER-128, but the expected value of the success probability of the attack depends on several bits of Konst. Hence the analysis of the distribution of the success probability must be much more difficult.
Discussion
Generally, the supposed attack in MAC forgery is adaptive chosen plaintext attack. However, the attack applied in the previous section is known plaintext attack. Any information about IVs and the secret key is not necessary as the attack is applicable even if the internal state is perfectly random. Besides, though SOBER-128 has authenticated encryption mechanism, encrypting messages does not strengthen the security of message authentication function because altering ciphertext is equal to altering plaintext for the encryption by a stream cipher.
Some Trials for the Improvement
The vulnerability of MAC generation algorithm of SOBER-128 is mainly derived from the fact that the substitution f is not uniformly non-linear. From the viewpoint of differential propagation, only the transformation of the most significant byte is non-linear. Besides, a rotation has no diffusion function. Hence at least 4 times iterations of these functions is necessary to apply the non-linear transformation to all bytes. This reduces the performance of SOBER-128.
Another idea to improve the security is injecting the output of PFF to plural registers for increasing the complexity. However, the transformation in Eq. (8) holds for any vector of the form (x i · v) i where the multiplication '·' is defined over GF (2 32 ). Hence this change of algorithm does not improve the security.
Replacing PFF by NLF seems better idea because it has more inputs from registers and more non-linear operations. However, more detailed use of NLF as a plaintext injection function and more detailed security evaluation should be done before real use.
Bound to Recover the Internal State
In Sect. 6 we show how to recover some bits of keydependent constant Konst. Our technique can be also used with linear distinguishing attacks, so that we recommend not to use an addition with key-dependent in a design of stream cipher. In general, a key-dependent constant could be a security weakness. However, linear attacks on SOBER-128 has not been successful so far, this is not a problem. Furthermore, Konst has small correlation with the LFSR so that it seems impossible to recover the whole internal state by extending our attack.
Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the MAC generation function and the authenticated encryption function of SOBER-128 are vulnerable under a certain practical assumption. We assume that the attacker intercepts the message and change some bits of the message, and sends it to the receiver. Under this assumption, the attacker can forge a message with probability 2 −6 and 2 −27 respectively.
